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Abstract
Unawareness is a form of bounded rationality where a person fails to conceive all
feasible acts or consequences or to perceive as feasible all conceivable act-consequence
links. We study the implications of unawareness for tort law, where relevant examples
include the discovery of a new product or technology (new act), of a new disease or
injury (new consequence), or that a product can cause an injury (new link). We ar-
gue that negligence has an important advantage over strict liability in a world with
unawareness negligence, through the stipulation of due care standards, spreads aware-
ness about the updated probability of harm.
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1 Introduction
Background. Economists traditionally model choice under uncertainty according to Sav-
ages theory of subjective expected utility (Savage, 1954). Savages theory posits a space of
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive states of the world, representing all possible
resolutions of uncertainty. It assumes that when a person chooses an act, although she is
uncertain about the true state of the world and therefore about the consequences of her
chosen act, she nevertheless has complete knowledge of the state space she knows all the
possible acts and all the possible consequences of each and every act.
In reality, however, a person often does not have complete knowledge of the state space.
This is known as unawareness. A person may be unaware of some acts, some consequences,
or that a known act can cause a known consequence. An extreme example of the latter is
that no one was aware that supporting anti-Soviet ghters in Afghanistan in the 1980s could
lead to the destruction of the World Trade Center in 2001.
Unawareness plays an important role in many legal spheres. A prime example is that
people may write incomplete contracts due to unforeseen contingencies. Another example is
that a person may be unaware that an act can result in criminal liability. A third example
is that a person may not be aware of all the objections that she can raise to a witnesss
testimony in a trial. In this paper, we study the implications of unawareness for tort law,
the part of the common law that governs liability for civil wrongs.
Tort liability rules and unawareness. A central question in the eld of law and eco-
nomics is whether negligence or strict liability is the more e¢ cient tort liability rule. Under
negligence, a victim can recover damages for harm caused by the activity of an injurer
who failed to take reasonable care when engaging in the activity. Under strict liability, by
contrast, a victim can recover damages for harm caused by the activity of an injurer irre-
spective of whether the injurer took reasonable care. The relative e¢ ciency of the two rules
is customarily measured by the Kaldor-Hicks criterion.
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A bedrock result in the economic analysis of tort law is that, in the case of unilateral
accidents with xed activity levels, negligence and strict liability are equally e¢ cient, pro-
vided that, in the case of negligence, the court properly sets the due care standard (the legal
standard for what constitutes reasonable care) (Shavell, 1987).1 This equivalence result,
however, presents something of a puzzle in light of two facts about negligence. First, negli-
gence is the dominant rule in Anglo-American law.2 Second, negligence is the more costly
rule to administer, because the court must determine the due care standard and adjudicate
whether the standard was met. The puzzle is that if negligence and strict liability are equally
e¢ cient but negligence is more costly to administer, why is negligence the dominant rule?
The negligence puzzle has led researchers to revisit the equivalence result by exploring
departures from the standard accident model, which is based on the expected utility frame-
work and the Bayesian paradigm. For instance, Teitelbaum (2007) and Chakravarty and
Kelsey (2017) explore ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty). They assume that the relevant
parties are Choquet expected utility maximizers with neo-additive beliefs about accident
risk, and they nd that this breaks the equivalence in favor of negligence.3
In this paper, we explore unawareness. Unawareness is the failure to conceive or perceive
the entire state space. It is a form of bounded rationality in which a person fails to conceive
all available acts or potential consequences or fails to perceive as feasible all conceivable act-
consequence links. Unawareness creates the possibility of growing awareness the expansion
of the state space when a person discovers a new act, consequence, or act-consequence link.
1In unilateral accidents, the injurer, but not the victim, can take care to reduce expected harm. In
unilateral accidents with xed activity levels, the injurer a¤ects expected harm only through her level of care
(and not through her level of activity). The equivalence result also holds in the case of bilateral accidents
with xed activity levels, provided that strict liability is coupled with the defense of contributory negligence.
2In modern Anglo-American law, strict liability applies only in a handful of accident cases, including
cases involving abnormally dangerous activities or products with manufacturing defects (Dobbs et al., 2011,
§ 2). Indeed, certain accident cases that were traditionally governed by strict liability are now governed by
negligence, including cases involving products with a design or warning defect (Dobbs et al., 2011, § 450).
3The neo-additive Choquet expected utility model was developed by Chateauneuf et al. (2007). Franzoni
(2017) models ambiguity aversion according to the smooth model of Klibano¤ et al. (2005). He nds that
strict liability dominates negligence when the injurer has lower degrees of uncertainty aversion than the
victim and can formulate more precise estimates of the probability of harm, but that negligence dominates
strict liability when harm is dispersed on a very large number of victims, irrespective of the partiesrespective
degrees of uncertainty aversion.
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Examples relevant to tort law include the discovery of a new product or technology (new
act), the discovery of a new disease or injury (new consequence), or the discovery that a
known product can cause a known injury (new act-consequence link).
We study the implications of unawareness for tort law, and specically for the negligence
versus strict liability debate. To model unawareness and growing awareness, which requires
a theory of how beliefs update as the state space expands, we adopt the reverse Bayesian
approach of Karni and Vierø (2013). Karni and Vierø (2013) posit that as a person becomes
aware of new acts, consequences, or act-consequence links, her beliefs update in a way that
preserves the relative likelihoods of events in the original state space. More specically,
they postulate that (i) in the case of a new act or consequence, probability mass shifts
proportionally away from the events in the original state space to the new events in the
expanded state space, and (ii) in the case of a new act-consequence link, null events in the
original state space become non-null, and probability mass shifts proportionally away from
the original non-null events to the original null events that become non-null.4
We argue that negligence has an important advantage over strict liability in a world with
unawareness and growing awareness. Under either liability rule, a tort litigation involving a
new act, consequence, or act-consequence link makes the world aware of a new possibility of
harm. Under negligence, however, the litigation provides the world with more information.
In particular, the courts stipulation of a new due care standard serves as a knowledge trans-
mission mechanism, providing the world with information about the updated probability of
harm. This information is necessary for either rule to induce the injurers of the world to
take e¢ cient care. Negligence provides this information to injurers. Under strict liability,
they would have to expend additional resources to develop this information on their own.
Related literature and our contributions. To our knowledge, this paper is the rst
to incorporate unawareness into the economic analysis of tort law. As such, we contribute
to the tort law and economics literature and to the unawareness literature, both of which
4A null event is an event believed to have zero probability.
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are too vast to review here. Surveys of the tort law and economics literature, which was
pioneered by Brown (1973),5 include Shavell (2007), Schäfer and Müller-Langer (2009), and
more recently Arlen (2017). Surveys of the unawareness literature, which was pioneered by
Fagin and Halpern (1988),6 include Schipper (2014) (which o¤ers a gentle introduction)
and Schipper (2015) (which provides an extended review).
Karni and Vierø (2013) are among the pioneers of the choice-theoretic approach (i.e., the
state-space approach) to modeling unawareness. Subsequent papers build on their approach.
For instance, Grant et al. (2017) invoke their approach to model learning by experimentation
in a world with unawareness; Karni and Vierø (2017) extend their model to the case where the
decision maker anticipates her growing awareness; and Dominiak and Tserenjigmid (2018)
generalize their model such that the decision maker perceives ambiguity in the wake of
growing awareness. Karni and Vierø (2013, 2017) and Dominiak and Tserenjigmid (2018)
survey the papers that take a choice-theoretic approach to modeling unawareness.
One limitation of Karni and Vierøs (2013) model is that reverse Bayesianism alone does
not fully determine the updated probability distribution over the expanded state space.
This is because reverse Bayesianism implies restrictions on the updated probabilities of non-
null events in the original state space, but not on the probabilities of new events in the
expanded state space.7 We overcome this limitation by assuming that acts are statistically
independent (though we show that negligence still has a partial advantage over strict liability
when we relax this assumption). We show that this additional restriction is su¢ cient to fully
determine the updated probability distribution in each case of growing awareness (new act,
new consequence, and new act-consequence link). In this way, we make a contribution to
the reverse Bayesian model, independent of our contributions to the economics of tort law.
5Other early contributions include Diamond (1974a,b), Green (1976), and Shavell (1980).
6Other early contributions include Modica and Rustichini (1994, 1999), Dekel et al. (1998), Halpern
(2001), Heifetz et al. (2006), and Halpern and Rêgo (2008).
7Karni and Vierø (2013, p. 2805) highlight this feature of reverse Bayesianism in their concluding remarks:
The model presented in this article predicts that, as awareness grows and the state space expands, the
relative likelihoods of events in the original state space remain unchanged. The model is silent about the
absolute levels of these probabilities. In other words, our theory does not predict the probability of the new
events in the expanded state space.
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A handful of papers apply unawareness models to study other legal topics. The bulk
of these focus on contracts. For example, Board and Chung (2011) argue that asymmetric
unawareness provides a justication for the contra proferentem doctrine of contract inter-
pretation, which provides that ambiguous terms in a contract should be construed against
the drafter; Zhao (2011) argues that unawareness may explain the existence of force majeure
clauses in contracts; Grant et al. (2012) study aspects of di¤erential awareness that give rise
to contractual disputes; Filiz-Ozbay (2012) posits asymmetric awareness as a reason for the
incompleteness of contracts; von Thadden and Zhao (2012, 2014) study the properties of
optimal contracts under moral hazard when the agent may be partially unaware of her ac-
tion space; and Auster (2013) introduces asymmetric unawareness into the canonical moral
hazard model and analyzes the properties of the optimal contract.
Within the tort law and economics literature, the papers closest to ours include the three
described above that explore the implications of ambiguity for tort law (Teitelbaum, 2007;
Chakravarty and Kelsey, 2017; Franzoni, 2017).8 Although ambiguity and unawareness are
distinct phenomena, both are types of uncertainty that the standard accident model does not
admit.9 Hence, we share a common enterprise with the papers on tort law and ambiguity.
We enrich the standard accident model to allow the parties to face not just risk but rather
a more profound and realistic type of uncertainty, and we explore the implications of such
uncertainty for the debate over tort liability rules.
We also share connections with Ott and Schäfer (1997), Feess and Wohlschlegel (2006),
and Currie and MacLeod (2014). Currie and MacLeod (2014) develop an alternative to
8Also related are the papers that explore the implications of risk aversion for tort law. In the seminal
paper on the topic, Shavell (1982) shows that strict liability is superior when the injurer is risk neutral and
the victim is risk averse, while negligence is superior in the opposite case. Franzoni (2017, n. 10) reviews
other papers on optimal tort liability rules under risk aversion and related contributions.
9Under ambiguity, the agent still conceives of the space of all relevant contingencies but has di¢ culties
to evaluate them probabilistically. Under unawareness, the agent cannot even conceive all relevant contin-
gencies (Schipper, 2014, p. 1). Researchers currently are exploring connections between ambiguity and
unawareness. For instance, Dominiak and Tserenjigmid (2018) generalize the model of Karni and Vierø
(2013) such that the decision maker perceives ambiguity in the wake of growing awareness. We draw a
similar connection between growing awareness and ambiguity in Section 4.4, where we discuss circumstances
under which reverse Bayesian updating results in ambiguity about the updated probability of harm.
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the standard accident model that makes use of state-space representations, dubbed Savage
Tables,to model the decision problems faced by an injurer (who is fully aware of the state
space) under di¤erent tort liability rules. They apply their model to argue, inter alia, that
negligence provides better incentives than strict liability in the case of the Good Samaritan.
Ott and Schäfer (1997) study how the due care standard in negligence develops when the
court starts with no information about the e¢ cient level of care and relies on information
provided by injurers and victims through litigation. In their model, an e¢ cient standard
evolves over time as a result of a learning process based on the information acquired by the
court from litigants. In a similar vein, Feess and Wohlschlegel (2006) compare negligence
and strict liability when some injurers have better information than others and the court
about the e¢ cient level of care and the court does not know which injurers are informed or
uninformed. They show that under certain conditions the court can learn the e¢ cient level
of care by imperfectly observing the injurers level of care in a large number of cases, and
that under negligence (but not strict liability) the uninformed injurers can in turn learn the
e¢ cient level of care by observing the courts due care standard.
Like Ott and Schäfer (1997) we study the evolution of the negligence due care standard in
response to knowledge generated by litigants, and like Feess andWohlschlegel (2006) we argue
that negligence has an advantage over strict liability in terms of knowledge transmission. Our
motivation and analysis fundamentally di¤er from theirs, however, as we consider a world
with symmetric unawareness whereas they consider a (fully aware) world with asymmetric
information. Moreover, we explicitly model the process of belief revision in the wake of
growing awareness and of knowledge transmission through the due care standard, while Ott
and Schäfer (1997) derive transition probabilities from one standard to another and Feess
and Wohlschlegel (2006) derive steady-state beliefs in a rational expectations equilibrium.
We also contribute to the relatively nascent but rapidly growing behavioral law and
economics literature. Sunstein (1997), Jolls et al. (1998), and Korobkin and Ulen (2000) were
early calls for the modication of standard law and economics models to reect advances in
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behavioral economics and decision theory. Sunstein (2000) and Parisi and Smith (2005) are
edited volumes that collect early papers in the literature. Zamir and Teichman (2014) and
Teitelbaum and Zeiler (2018) are more recent volumes. Halbersberg and Guttel (2014) and
Luppi and Parisi (2018) provide surveys of behavioral models of tort law.
Structure of the paper. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the accident model a unilateral accident model featuring multiple activities with
xed levels and derives the equivalence result. Section 3 presents the unawareness model
and provides relevant examples of new acts, new consequences, and new act-consequence
links. Section 4 compares and contrasts negligence and strict liability in a world with un-
awareness. It considers a simplied model with two acts, two consequences, quadratic care
costs, and linear expected harm reduction, and separately analyzes the cases of a new act, a
new consequence, and a new act-consequence link. Section 5 extends the analysis to a more
general model with m acts, n consequences, convex care costs, and convex expected harm
reduction. Section 6 discusses the results and suggests directions for future research. The
Appendix collects the proofs of the propositions and corollaries stated in Sections 4 and 5.
2 The Accident Model
There are two agents: an injurer and a victim. Both are risk neutral subjective expected util-
ity maximizers. The agents are strangers and not in a contractual relationship. Transaction
costs are su¢ ciently high to preclude Coasian bargaining.
The injurer has available m  2 activities, f1; : : : ; fm. Each activity has the potential to
cause harm to the victim, though we assume the outcomes are independent across activities.
That is, we assume the activities are independent experiments, akin tom one-armed bandits.
We refer to this assumption below as act independence.10
10While act independence is a reasonable assumption in many settings, there undoubtedly are settings in
which it is not. We explore the implications of relaxing the act indpendence assumption in Section 4.4.
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There are n  2 potential degrees of harm, z1; : : : ; zn, where zj  0 for all j = 1; : : : ; n.
Activity fi causes harm zj with probability ij, where
Pn
j=1 ij = 1 for all i = 1; : : : ;m.
Thus, activity fis expected harm is
Pn
j=1 ijzj. In the absence of unawareness, the agents
have correct beliefs about each harm probability ij.
The injurer engages in each available activity. For each activity fi, the injurer, but not
the victim, can take care to reduce the activitys expected harm to the victim. The injurer
chooses a level of care xi  0 having cost c(xi). Being careless is costless, c(0) = 0, and the
marginal cost of care is positive and increasing: c0(xi) > 0 and c00(xi) > 0 for all xi: Taking
care reduces the activitys expected harm at a non-increasing rate: hi(xi) 
Pn
j=1 ijzj(xi),
where (xi) 2 (0; 1] for all xi with (0) = 1 and where  0(xi) < 0 and  00(xi)  0 for all xi.
We assume that c() and () are known and the same for all activities. We make the latter
assumption for simplicity. It is without loss of generality given the former assumption.
If activity fi causes harm, the victim may be entitled to damages from the injurer,
depending on the applicable tort liability rule. Under negligence, the victim is entitled to
damages equal to the harm if the injurers level of care was below the due care standard
for the activity, xi, which is stipulated by the court.11 Under strict liability, the victim is
entitled to damages equal to the harm irrespective of the injurers level of care. We assume
the injurer has the ability to pay any and all damages to which the victim may be entitled.
The social goal is to minimize the total social costs of the injurers activities (the sum of
the costs of care and the expected harms):
minimize
x1;:::;xm0
Pm
i=1 c(xi) + hi(xi):
The solution ex = (ex1; : : : ; exm) is given implicitly by the rst order conditions
c0(exi) =  h0i(exi); i = 1; : : : ;m;
11Following in the tradition of the tort law and economics literature, we model the due care standard as a
precise stipulation. In reality, the due care standard may be less specic. For a discussion on the specicity
of the due care standard at common law, see Dobbs et al. (2011, § 145).
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and is given explicitly by
exi =  1 Pnj=1 ijzj ; i = 1; : : : ;m;
where  1 denotes the inverse of (xi)   c0(xi)= 0(xi).12 We refer to exi as the e¢ cient level
of care for activity fi. It is the level of care at which the marginal cost of care equals the
marginal benet (the marginal reduction in expected harm).
Under strict liability, the injurers problem is identical to the social goal. This is because
strict liability forces the injurer to internalize the total social costs of her activities. Hence,
strict liability induces the injurer to take e¢ cient care in each activity.
Under negligence, the injurers problem is
minimize
x1;:::;xm0
Pm
i=1 c(xi) + hi(xi)(xi < xi),
where (xi < xi) 
8><>: 1 if xi < xi0 otherwise
and where xi is the due care standard for activity fi. If the court sets xi = exi for all i, then
the injurer takes e¢ cient care in each activity. The reason is twofold. First, the injurer will
not take more than the e¢ cient level of care, because she faces no liability if her level of care
equals or exceeds the e¢ cient level. Second, the injurer will not take less than the e¢ cient
level of care, because then she faces strictly liability, which induces her to take e¢ cient care.
The equivalence result follows immediately from the foregoing.
Theorem 1 (Equivalence Result). The injurer will take e¢ cient care in each activity under
either negligence or strict liability, provided that, in the case of negligence, the court sets the
due care standard for each activity equal to the e¢ cient level of care for that activity.
12Note that 0(xi) =
c0(xi) 00(xi)  0(xi)c00(xi)
[ 0(xi)]2
> 0 for all xi; hence  is invertible.
9
3 The Unawareness Model
In this section we describe the model of unawareness and provide some examples of recent
tort cases that illustrate the three cases of growing unawareness.
We model unawareness and growing awareness à la Karni and Vierø (2013). The primi-
tives of the model are a nite, non-empty set F of feasible acts and a nite, non-empty set Z
of feasible consequences. In our setting, the feasible acts are the injurers available activities
and the feasible consequences are the potential harms to the victim.
States are functions from the set of acts to the set of consequences. A state assigns a
consequence to each act. The set of all possible states, ZF , denes the conceivable state
space. With m acts and n consequences, there are nm conceivable states.
The agents and the court (collectively, the parties) originally conceive the sets of acts
and consequences to be F = ff1; : : : ; fmg and Z = fz1; : : : ; zng. The conceivable state space
is ZF = fs1; : : : ; snmg, where each state s 2 ZF is a vector of length m, the ith element of
which, si, is the consequence zj 2 Z produced by act fi 2 F in that state of the world.
An act-consequence link, or link, is a causal relationship between an act and a conse-
quence. The conceivable state space admits all conceivable links. However, the parties may
perceive one or more links as infeasible, which brings them to nullify the states that admit
such link. We refer to these as null states and denote them by N  ZF . Taking only
the non-null states denes the feasible state space, S  ZFnN . When N 6= ;, there areQm
i=1(n  i) feasible states, where i denotes the number of nullied links involving act fi.
The parties have common beliefs represented by a probability measure p on the conceiv-
able state space, ZF . The support set of p is the feasible state space, S. That is, the parties
assign non-zero probability to each non-null state and zero probability to each null state.
The parties may initially fail to conceive one or more acts or consequences or to perceive
as feasible one or more conceivable links. We refer to such failures of conception or perception
as unawareness. However, the parties may later discover a new act or consequence, which
expands both the feasible state space and the conceivable state space, or a new link, which
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expands the feasible state space but not the conceivable state space.13 We refer to such
discoveries and expansions as growing awareness.
To illustrate, suppose S = ZF and the parties discover a new consequence, zn+1. Then
the set of potential harms becomes bZ = Z [ fzn+1g and the feasible and conceivable state
spaces both expand to bS = bZF = fs1; : : : ; s(n+1)mg, where each state remains a vector of
length m. Alternatively, suppose the parties discover a new act, fm+1. Then the set of
available activities becomes bF = F [ ffm+1g and the feasible and conceivable state spaces
both expand to bS = Z bF = fs1; : : : ; sn(m+1)g, where each state now is a vector of length
m + 1. Lastly, suppose S  ZF because the parties initially perceive as infeasible the link
from f1 to zn. Discovery of the link from f1 to zn does not alter the conceivable state space,
but the feasible state space expands to coincide with the conceivable state space: bS = ZF .
Illustrative depictions of conceivable and feasible state spaces and their expansion due to the
discovery of new acts, consequences, and links can be found in Section 4.
In the wake of growing awareness, the partiesbeliefs update in a way that preserves the
relative likelihoods of the events in the original feasible state space (which are the non-null
events in the original conceivable state space). In each case of growing awareness, probability
mass shifts proportionally away from the events in the original feasible state space to the
new events in the expanded feasible state space. In the case of a new act or consequence,
the new events in the expanded feasible state space are also new events in the expanded
conceivable state space. In the case of a new link, the new events in the expanded feasible
state space are the null events in the original conceivable state space that become non-null.
Karni and Vierø refer to this updating as reverse Bayesianism. Let bp denote the parties
updated beliefs. Formally, reverse Bayesianism implies: (i) in the case of a new consequence
or link, p(s)=p(t) = bp(s)=bp(t) for all s; t 2 S; and (ii) in the case of a new act, p(s)=p(t) =
bp(E(s))=bp(E(t)) for all s; t 2 S, where E(s) denotes the event in bS that corresponds to state
s in S; that is, E(s)  ft 2 bS : ti = si for all i 6= m+ 1g (assuming the new act is fm+1).
13To be clear, by newwe mean not previously conceived in the case of acts and consequences, and
previously conceived but perceived as infeasiblein the case of links.
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The act independence assumption implies additional restrictions on bp. Let Ai(zj)  bS
denote the event that fi yields zj; that is, Ai(zj)  ft 2 bS : ti = zjg. We refer to events of
this type as act events. Act independence implies Ai(zj) ? Ai0(zj0) for all i and i0 where i 6= i0
and all j and j0.14 Take any event E  bS. We can express each state s = (s1; : : : ; sm) 2 E
as the intersection of a unique collection of independent act events: s =
T
iAi(s
i). It follows
that bp(s) = Qi bp (Ai(si)) for all s 2 E. Observe that growing awareness, whether it entails
a new act, consequence, or link, gives rise to a new event  = bSnS. Thus, in each case of
growing awareness, act independence implies bp(s) = Qi bp (Ai(si)) for all s 2 .
3.1 Examples of Growing Awareness
Instances of growing awareness that are relevant to tort law include the discovery of a new
and potentially harmful product or technology (new act), the discovery of a new disease or
injury (new consequence), or the discovery that a known product can cause a known injury
in a previously unknown way (new link). We list below a few illustrative examples.
3.1.1 New Acts
Fracking. Modern day hydraulic fracturing, or fracking,was developed by George Mitchell
in the late 1990s, though its origins can be traced to the 1860s (Gold, 2014). In Ely v. Cabot
Oil and Gas Corporation, a Pennsylvania jury found in favor of nine plainti¤s on claims that
the defendants fracking activity at two natural gas wells in Susquehanna County in the mid-
2000s was negligent and caused the plainti¤scompensable nuisance injuries by interfering
with and damaging the plainti¤saccess to water and their enjoyment of their property. The
gravamen of the plainti¤scomplaint was that the defendants fracking activity negligently
permitted methane to ow into underground aquifers that wound up polluting the plainti¤s
water wells.15 Less than two years after the jury verdict in 2016, and less than three months
14The symbol ? denotes statistical independence. Acts are assumed to be independent with respect to
both the ex-ante and ex-post probabilities.
15See 2017 WL 1196510 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (denying defendants motion for judgment as a matter of law
but granting its motion for a new trial). The case settled before the second trial.
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after the case was nally settled in 2017, the defendant and 25 other major oil and gas
companies, under the auspices of the American Petroleum Institute, announced that they
were launching a new program, called the Environmental Partnership, focused on reducing
emissions of methane and other pollutants from the natural gas sector (Henry, 2017).
Cyberbullying. The World Wide Web was invented by Tim Berners-Lee in 1989 (Gillies
and Cailliau, 2000). In D.C. v. R.R., a Los Angeles high school student brought an action
against several of his fellow students who had posted messages at his Web site making
derogatory comments about his perceived sexual orientation and threatening him with bodily
harm claiming, inter alia, defamation and intentional iniction of emotional distress.16
According to the Cyberbullying Research Center (2016), the rate of cyberbullying o¤ending
among U.S. middle and high school students decreased by 40 percent in the six years after
the key decision in the case by the California Court of Appeal in 2010.
3.1.2 New Consequences
HIV/AIDS. The rst HIV/AIDS cases were reported in the United States in 1981 (U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011). In Quintana v. United Blood Services, a
Denver jury held the defendant liable to the plainti¤ for negligently supplying her with HIV
contaminated blood in 1983 (Talavera, 1993).17 In the three decades since the case was led,
U.S. blood banks, through the use of donor educational material, specic deferral questions,
and advances in HIV donor testing . . . have reduced the risk of HIV transmission from
blood transfusion from about 1 in 2500 units . . . to a current estimated residual risk of
about 1 in 1.47 million transfusions(U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2015, p. 2).
16See 182 Cal. App. 4th 1190 (2010) (a¢ rming the trial courts denial of defendantsmotion to strike
under Californias strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) statute).
17The jury also held the defendant liable to the plainti¤s husband for negligent iniction of emotional
distress and loss of consortium. The case was initially led in the late 1980s and the nal verdict was
rendered in 1992 (Talavera, 1993).
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Mad cow disease. Mad cow disease, also known as bovine spongiform encephalopathy
(BSE), was rst discovered in the United Kingdom in 1986 (Collee and Bradley, 1997). In
2008, Ridley Inc., a Winnipeg cattle feed supplier, settled a class action by Canadian cattle
farmers claiming that the defendant negligently supplied them with BSE contaminated feed
in the early 1990s (Dowd, 2008). Still pending is a related class action against the Canadian
government for negligently allowing BSE infected cattle to be imported into Canada in the
late 1980s and used for feed ingredients in the early 1990s (Kienlen, 2017). In 2007, two
years after the class action was led, the Canadian government implemented an enhanced
feed ban aimed at preventing the spread of BSE (Stephenson, 2015).
3.1.3 New Links
Agent Orange and cancer. Agent Orange, a chemical herbicide, was developed in the
1940s and used by the U.S. military as part of its herbicidal warfare program, Operation
Ranch Hand, during the Vietnam War (Schuck, 1987). The rst recorded case of cancer
hails from ancient Egypt, and the origin of the word cancer is credited to the ancient Greek
physician Hippocrates (Sudhakar, 2009). In In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation,
Vietnam veterans brought a class action against the manufacturers of Agent Orange alleging,
inter alia, that their exposure to Agent Orange in Vietnam resulted in a variety of cancers
and other diseases in the veterans and birth defects in their children.18 The class action was
led in 1979. In 1983, seven months before the parties reached a settlement, Dow Chemical
Company, the lead defendant in the class action, announced that it was permanently dis-
continuing production of 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid, the component of Agent Orange
that was responsible for its toxicity (Holusha, 1983; American Chemical Society, 1985).
American football and CTE. The National Football League (NFL) was founded in
1920 (Crepeau, 2014). Chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE), a neurodegenerative brain
disease found in people with a history of repetitive head injuries, was rst reported in boxers
18See 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). The case was settled for $180 million.
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in 1928 and in NFL players in 2005 (Lindsley, 2017). In In re National Football League
Players Concussion Injury Litigation, retired NFL players brought a class action against the
NFL alleging that the league had failed to take reasonable actions to protect the players from
CTE and other chronic risks of head injuries in football.19 The action was led in 2011. Seven
months before the parties reached a settlement in 2013, the NFL announced a new concussion
protocol, which includes guidelines for sideline evaluation and rules on preseason education,
baseline testing, and the establishment of personnel to conduct evaluations (Flynn, 2016).
In each of the foregoing examples the initial lawsuit increased awareness and precaution
undertaken by injurers.
4 Illustrative Results
In this section and the next, we compare and contrast negligence and strict liability in a
world with unawareness. In both sections, we assume the parties are fully rational apart from
unawareness. We further assume that when the parties are unaware of an act, consequence,
or link, their beliefs, although incorrect with respect to the absolute likelihoods of events,
are nevertheless correct with respect to the relative likelihoods of non-null events. Without
this assumption, the parties could not have correct beliefs when they become fully aware,
which would be inconsistent with the standard accident model.
In this section we consider a simple model with two acts, F = ff1; f2g; two consequences,
Z = fz1; z2g, where z1 = 0 and z2 > 0; quadratic care costs, c(xi) = (xi)2; and linear expected
harm reduction, (xi) = (1   xi).20 Our analysis of this simple model illustrates all of the
main ideas of the paper. In the next section we show that the results extend to a more
general model. In both sections we maintain the assumption that c() and () are known
and the same for all activities. As previously stated, we make the latter assumption for
simplicity; it is without loss of generality given the former assumption.
19See 821 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2016). The case was settled for approximately $1 billion.
20To preserve the condition (xi) > 0 for all xi, we assume xi 2 [0; 1) in this section.
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With two acts (activities), f1 and f2, and two consequences (harms), z1 = 0 and z2 > 0,
the conceivable state space, ZF , comprises four states: s1 = (0; 0), s2 = (0; z2), s3 = (z2; 0),
and s4 = (z2; z2). Let pk  p(sk), k = 1; : : : ; 4, denote the partiescommon beliefs on ZF .
We can depict the original conceivable state space and the partiesbeliefs as follows:
p p1 p2 p3 p4
FnZF s1 s2 s3 s4
f1 0 0 z2 z2
f2 0 z2 0 z2 :
4.1 New Link
We start with the case of a new link. We assume the parties initially perceive activity f1 as
safe and activity f2 as risky (i.e.. capable of resulting in harm). That is, we assume they
initially perceive the event fs3; s4g as infeasible (null). This implies p3 = p4 = 0. We can
depict the original feasible state space, S  ZF , as follows:
p p1 p2
FnS s1 s2
f1 0 0
f2 0 z2 :
Given S and p, the e¢ cient levels of care are
ex1 = 0 and ex2 = p2z2
2
:
Under negligence, the court stipulates x1 = ex1 and x2 = ex2 as the due care standards for f1
and f2, respectively.
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Suppose the parties discover that activity f1 is risky. In particular, suppose that the
injurer engages in f1, that it results in harm z2, and that the victim brings a tort suit
against the injurer before the court. The feasible state space expands to coincide with the
conceivable state space, bS = ZF , and the parties update their beliefs from p to bp:
bp bp1 bp2 bp3 bp4
FnbS s1 s2 s3 s4
f1 0 0 z2 z2
f2 0 z2 0 z2 :
We assume that, by virtue of the suit, the parties learn that activity f1 yields harm z2
with probability  > 0. The fact is the parties have the incentive to expend resources to
develop this knowledge. As the Hand formula makes plain,21 the probability of harm is an
essential component of a negligence case. Even in a strict liability case, the probability of
harm is relevant to the issues of foreseeability and proximate cause.22
Note that  is the total probability of the new states in the expanded feasible state space.
It is a measure of the likelihood of the event of which the parties were previously unaware.
Thus, we interpret  as the degree of unawareness.
By reverse Bayesianism,
p1
p2
=
bp1bp2 :
In addition,  = bp3 + bp4 (by denition) and bp1 + bp2 + bp3 + bp4 = 1. Moreover, by act
independence,
bp3 = (bp3 + bp4)(bp1 + bp3) and bp4 = (bp3 + bp4)(bp2 + bp4):
It follows that:
Proposition 1. bp1 = (1  )p1; bp2 = (1  )p2; bp3 = p1; and bp4 = p2.
21See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947); Posner (1998).
22Alternatively, we could assume the court learns  by virtue of a sequence of suits (cf. Ott and Schäfer,
1997; Feess and Wohlschlegel, 2006).
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Remark 1. Note that p is the Bayesian update of bp conditional on the event fs1; s2g; hence
the term reverse Bayesianism.
Given bS and bp, the e¢ cient levels of care are
bex1 = (bp3 + bp4) z2
2
=
z2
2
and bex2 = (bp2 + bp4)z2
2
=
p2z2
2
:
Note that bex1 > ex1 but bex2 = ex2. Thus, the discovery that f1 is risky necessitates the
stipulation of a new due care standard for f1 but not for f2.
Under negligence, the court stipulates bx1 = bex1 as the new due care standard for f1
and holds the injurer liable to pay damages of z2 to the victim.23 This makes the injurers
and victims of the world aware that f1 is risky. Moreover, they can deduce  from bx1;
specically,  = 2bex1=z2. As a result, they can learn bp and bh1(x1) = z2(x1), without
expending additional resources to learn about . Knowledge of bh1(x1) is necessary to induce
injurers to take e¢ cient care.
Under strict liability, the court simply holds the injurer liable to pay damages of z2 to the
victim. This makes the injurers and victims of the world aware that f1 is risky. However,
they cannot deduce  or learn bp or bh1(x1). Without knowledge of bh1(x1), strict liability
cannot induce injurers to take e¢ cient care.
Remark 2. If c() and () are the same for all injurers, then knowledge of bh1(x1) is not
strictly necessary to induce them to take e¢ cient care under negligence, because they can
just blindly adopt bx1 as their level of care, without bothering to deduce  from bx1 and learnbh1(x1). If, however, either c() or () varies across injurers, then they need to deduce 
from bx1 in order to learn their own bh1(x1), which is necessary for them to take e¢ cient care.
23Recall that x1 = ex1 = 0 before the parties discover that f1 is potentially harmful. Under negligence,
therefore, the injurer will have exercised no care in conjunction with f1. However, even if the court does
not hold the injurer liable and award damages (perhaps by recognizing a civil ex post facto doctrine which
prohibits retroactive application of a due care standard in a negligence suit), our results below would not
change, because the world already knows the set of potential harms.
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Moreover, injurers always need to know bh1(x1) in order to take e¢ cient care under strict
liability, because the court does not stipulate a due care standard under strict liability.
4.2 New Act
We next consider the case of a new act. We assume the original feasible state space coincides
with the original conceivable state space (i.e., S = ZF ):
p p1 p2 p3 p4
FnS s1 s2 s3 s4
f1 0 0 z2 z2
f2 0 z2 0 z2 :
Given S and p, the e¢ cient levels of care are
ex1 = (p3 + p4)z2
2
and ex2 = (p2 + p4)z2
2
:
Under negligence, the court stipulates x1 = ex1 and x2 = ex2 as the due care standards for f1
and f2, respectively.
Suppose the parties discover a new activity, f3, which has the potential to cause harm.
In particular, suppose that the injurer discovers and engages in f3, that it results in harm
z2, and that the victim brings a tort suit against the injurer before the court. The feasible
state space expands from four to eight states:
bp bp1 bp2 bp3 bp4 bp5 bp6 bp7 bp8
FnbS s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8
f1 0 0 z2 z2 0 0 z2 z2
f2 0 z2 0 z2 0 z2 0 z2
f3 0 0 0 0 z2 z2 z2 z2 :
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The expanded feasible state space contains two copies of the original feasible state space, one
in which f3 results in no harm and one in which f3 results in harm z2. Stated di¤erently, the
expanded space splits each of the original states into two depending on whether f3 yields no
harm or harm z2. For each state in the original feasible state space there is a corresponding
event in the expanded feasible state space. For instance, the event fs1; s5g 2 bS corresponds
to state s1 2 S, the event fs2; s6g 2 bS corresponds to state s2 2 S, etc.24
As before, we assume that, by virtue of the suit, the parties learn that activity f3 yields
harm z2 with probability  > 0. By reverse Bayesianism,
p1
p2
=
bp1 + bp5bp2 + bp6 ; p1p3 = bp1 + bp5bp3 + bp7 ; p1p4 = bp1 + bp5bp4 + bp8 ;
p2
p3
=
bp2 + bp6bp3 + bp7 ; p2p4 = bp2 + bp6bp4 + bp8 ; and p3p4 = bp3 + bp7bp4 + bp8 :
In addition,  = bp5 + bp6 + bp7 + bp8 (by denition) and bp1 +    + bp8 = 1. Moreover, by act
independence,
bp5 = (bp1 + bp2 + bp5 + bp6)(bp1 + bp3 + bp5 + bp7) (bp5 + bp6 + bp7 + bp8) ;
bp6 = (bp1 + bp2 + bp5 + bp6)(bp2 + bp4 + bp6 + bp8) (bp5 + bp6 + bp7 + bp8) ;
bp7 = (bp3 + bp4 + bp7 + bp8)(bp1 + bp3 + bp5 + bp7) (bp5 + bp6 + bp7 + bp8) ;
and bp8 = (bp3 + bp4 + bp7 + bp8)(bp2 + bp4 + bp6 + bp8) (bp5 + bp6 + bp7 + bp8) :
It follows that:
Proposition 2. bp1 = (1  )p1; bp2 = (1  )p2; bp3 = (1  )p3; bp4 = (1  )p4;bp5 = p1; bp6 = p2; bp7 = p3; and bp8 = p4:
24Note that the conceivable state space also expands from four to eight states, so bS = Z bF .
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Given bS and bp, the e¢ cient levels of care are
bex1 = (bp3 + bp4 + bp7 + bp8) z2
2
=
(p3 + p4)z2
2
;
bex2 = (bp2 + bp4 + bp6 + bp8) z2
2
=
(p2 + p4)z2
2
;
and bex3 = (bp5 + bp6 + bp7 + bp8) z2
2
=
z2
2
:
Thus, the discovery of f3 necessitates the stipulation of a new due care standard, bx3, but it
does not necessitate the stipulation of a new due care standard for f1 or f2.
Under negligence, the court stipulates bx3 = bex3 as the due care standard for the new
activity f3 and holds the injurer liable to pay damages of z2 to the victim.25 This makes the
injurers and victims of the world aware of f3 (and that it is risky). Moreover, they can deduce
 from bx3; specically,  = 2bex3=z2. As a result, they can learn bp and bh3(x3) = z2(x3),
without expending additional resources to learn about . Knowledge of bh3(x3) is necessary
to induce injurers to take e¢ cient care.
Under strict liability, the court simply holds the injurer liable to pay damages of z2 to
the victim. This makes injurers and victims aware of f3 (and that it is risky). However, they
cannot deduce  or learn bp or bh3(x3). Without knowledge of bh3(x3), strict liability cannot
induce injurers to take e¢ cient care.
4.3 New Consequence
We last consider the case of a new consequence. As with the case of a new act, we assume
S = ZF :
p p1 p2 p3 p4
FnS s1 s2 s3 s4
f1 0 0 z2 z2
f2 0 z2 0 z2 :
25Again, because the world already knows the set of potential harms, our results below would not change
if the court does not hold the injurer liable and award damages.
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Given S and p, the e¢ cient levels of care are
ex1 = (p3 + p4)z2
2
and ex2 = (p2 + p4)z2
2
:
Under negligence, the court stipulates x1 = ex1 and x2 = ex2 as the due care standards for f1
and f2, respectively.
Suppose the parties discover a new consequence, z3 > z2, which they link to f1 and f2.
In particular, suppose that the injurer engages in f1 and f2, that each results in harm z3,
and that the victim brings a tort suit against the injurer before the court. The feasible state
space expands from four to nine states:
bp bp1 bp2 bp3 bp4 bp5 bp6 bp7 bp8 bp9
FnbS s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9
f1 0 0 z2 z2 z3 z3 0 z2 z3
f2 0 z2 0 z2 0 z2 z3 z3 z3 :
The expanded feasible state space is characterized by three events, one in which f1 results
in no harm, one in which f1 results in harm z2, and one in which f1 results in harm z3. Each
event contains three states, one in which f2 results in no harm, one in which f2 results in z2,
and one in which f2 results in z3.26
We assume that, by virtue of the suit, the parties learn that activity f1 yields z3 with
probability  > 0 and activity f2 yields z3 with probability  > 0. (This is analogous to
assuming the parties learn  in the case of a new link or act.) By reverse Bayesianism,
p1
p2
=
bp1bp2 ; p1p3 = bp1bp3 ; p1p4 = bp1bp4 ;
p2
p3
=
bp2bp3 ; p2p4 = bp2bp4 ; and p3p4 = bp3bp4 :
26Note that the conceivable state space also expands from four to nine states, so bS = bZF .
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In addition,  = bp5 + bp6 + bp9 and  = bp7 + bp8 + bp9 (both by denition) and bp1 +   + bp9 = 1.
By act independence,
bp5 = (bp5 + bp6 + bp9)(bp1 + bp3 + bp5); bp6 = (bp5 + bp6 + bp9)(bp2 + bp4 + bp6);
bp7 = (bp1 + bp2 + bp7)(bp7 + bp8 + bp9); bp8 = (bp3 + bp4 + bp8)(bp7 + bp8 + bp9);
and bp9 = (bp5 + bp6 + bp9)(bp7 + bp8 + bp9):
It follows that:
Proposition 3. bp1 = (1 )(1 )p1; bp2 = (1 )(1 )p2; bp3 = (1 )(1 )p3;bp4 = (1  )(1  )p4; bp5 = (1  )(p1 + p3); bp6 = (1  )(p2 + p4);bp7 = (1  )(p1 + p2); bp8 = (1  )(p3 + p4); and bp9 = .
Note that the degree of unawareness is  = bp5 + bp6 + bp7 + bp8 + bp9 = +     and that
1   = (1  )(1  ). We can rewrite bp in terms of  as follows:
Corollary 1. bp1 = (1  )p1; bp2 = (1  )p2; bp3 = (1  )p3; bp4 = (1  )p4;bp5 = 1 (1  )(p1 + p3) = (   )(p1 + p3); bp6 = 1 (1  )(p2 + p4) = (   )(p2 + p4);bp7 = 1  (1  )(p1 + p2) = (   )(p1 + p2); bp8 = 1  (1  )(p3 + p4) = (   )(p3 + p4);
and bp9 =  +    .
Given bS and bp, the e¢ cient levels of care are,
bex1 = (bp3 + bp4 + bp8)z2 + (bp5 + bp6 + bp9)z3
2
=
(1  )(p3 + p4)z2 + z3
2
and bex2 = (bp2 + bp4 + bp6)z2 + (bp7 + bp8 + bp9)z3
2
=
(1  )(p2 + p4)z2 + z3
2
:
Note that bex1 > ex1 and bex2 > ex2. Thus, the discovery of z3 necessitates the stipulation of new
due care standards for both f1 and f2.
Under negligence, the court stipulates bx1 = bex1 and bx2 = bex2 as the new due care standards
for f1 and f2, respectively. The court holds the injurer liable to pay damages of z3 to the
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victim with respect to each of f1 and f2. This makes the injurers and victims of the world
aware of z3 (and that it is linked to f1 and f2).27 Moreover, they can deduce  and  (and,
therefore, ) from bx1 and bx2; specically,
 =
p3z2   2bex1 + p4z2
p3z2   z3 + p4z2 and  =
p2z2   2bex2 + p4z2
p2z2   z3 + p4z2 .
As a result, they can learn bp and
bh1(x1) = [(1  )(p3 + p4)z2 + z3](x1)
and bh2(x2) = [(1  )(p2 + p4)z2 + z3](x2);
without expending additional resources to learn about  and . Knowledge of bh1(x1) andbh2(x2) is necessary to induce injurers to take e¢ cient care.
Under strict liability, the court simply holds the injurer liable to pay damages of z3 for
each instance of harm. This makes the injurers and victims of the world aware of z3 (and
that it is linked to f1 and f2). However, they cannot deduce  or  or learn bp, bh1(x1), orbh2(x2). Without knowledge of bh1(x1) and bh2(x2), strict liability cannot induce e¢ cient care.
4.4 Act Independence
Before turning to the general results, we conclude this section with a few remarks about the
act independence assumption. In short, we argue that it is a useful simplifying assumption,
but that it is not crucial. Even without act independence, negligence would reveal useful
information to injurers regarding the updated probability of harm.
As revealed by the proofs of Propositions 1 through 3, reverse Bayesianism alone is not
su¢ cient to fully determine the updated probability distribution bp. To borrow a term from
the econometrics literature, reverse Bayesianism only partially identies bp. The reason is
27Even if the court does not hold the injurer liable and award damages, the victims claims make the world
aware of z3 (and that it is linked to f1 and f2).
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that reverse Bayesianism implies restrictions on the updated probabilities of non-null states
in the original state space (or, in the case of a new act, their corresponding events in the
expanded state space), but not on the probabilities of new states in the expanded state space.
In other words, reverse Bayesianism prescribes how probability mass shifts away from non-
null states in the original state space to the corresponding states or events in the expanded
state space, but it does not dictate how the shifted probability mass is distributed among
the new states in the expanded state space. This is where act independence comes in. It
determines how the shifted probability mass is apportioned among the new states. Together,
reverse Bayesianism and act independence fully identify bp.
How realistic is act independence? The answer depends on the nature of the specic
activities in question. For instance, the risk that fracking for natural gas results in ground-
water contamination is likely to be independent of the risk that importing liqueed natural
gas results in a re or explosion. By contrast, the risk of contracting HIV from sharing
drug injection needles is likely to be correlated with the risk of contracting HIV from having
unprotected sex, since both depend on the prevalence of HIV in the population.
Because there exist activities whose outcomes are not independent, it is useful to inves-
tigate the importance of the act independence assumption for our results.
New link. In the case of a new link, reverse Bayesianism alone implies bp1 = (1   )p1,bp2 = (1  )p2, and bp3 + bp4 = . Importantly, reverse Bayesianism alone is not su¢ cient to
separately identify bp3 and bp4. As it turns out, this does not create an issue with respect to
activity f1. Recall that, by assumption, the parties learn  (the probability that f1 yields
z2). Because the e¢ cient level of care for f1 is a function of the sum bp3 + bp4, the court can
stipulate a new due care standard for f1 in terms of . This is su¢ cient to make the injurers
and victims of the world aware that f1 is potentially harmful. Moreover, they can deduce 
from the new due care standard for f1 and, in turn, learn bh1(x1) = z2(x1).
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Relaxing act independence, however, creates ambiguity with respect to the updated risk
of activity f2. Because the e¢ cient level of care for f2 is a function of the sum bp2 + bp4,
without act independence (or another assumption that separately identies bp3 and bp4), the
court cannot stipulate a precise new due care standard for f2. The best the court can do is
specify lower and upper bounds, using the knowledge that bp4 2 (0; ). Given these bounds,
the best the injurers and victims of the world can do is infer bounds on bh2(x2).
Of course, the ambiguity can be resolved if, by virtue of the suit, the parties learn more
about bp. For instance, if the parties learn not only  but also either bp2 + bp4 (the updated
probability that f2 yields z2) or bp4 (the joint probability that f1 and f2 yield z2), this is
su¢ cient to separately identify bp3 and bp4. With this, the court can stipulate a precise new
due care standard for f2, from which the injurers and victims of the world can deduce bp2 +bp4
and, in turn, learn bh2(x2) = (bp2 + bp4)z2(x2).
New act. In the case of a new act, reverse Bayesianism alone implies bp1 + bp5 = p1,bp2 + bp6 = p2, bp3 + bp7 = p3, bp4 + bp8 = p4, and bp5 + bp6 + bp7 + bp8 = . Recall that the e¢ cient
level of care for f1 is a function of the sum bp3 + bp4 + bp7 + bp8; the e¢ cient level of care for f2
is a function of the sum bp2 + bp4 + bp6 + bp8; and the e¢ cient level of care for f3 is a function of
the sum bp5 + bp6 + bp7 + bp8. Hence, even without act independence, the courts information is
su¢ ciently precise (i) to know that it need not stipulate new due care standards for activities
f1 and f2 and (ii) to stipulate a due care standard for the new activity f3. This makes the
injurers and victims of the world aware of f3 (and that it is risky). Moreover, they can
deduce  from the due care standard for f3 and, in turn, learn bh3(x3) = z2(x3).
New consequence. In the case of a new consequence, reverse Bayesianism alone implies
bp1 = (1  )p1, bp2 = (1  )p2, bp3 = (1  )p3, bp4 = (1  )p4, and bp5 + bp6 + bp7 + bp8 + bp9 = .
By assumption, the parties learn bp5 + bp6 + bp9 =  (the probability that f1 yields z3) andbp7 + bp8 + bp9 =  (the probability that f2 yields z3). Assume the parties also learn bp9 (the
joint probability that f1 and f2 yield z3), and let bp9 = . Note that  =  +    .
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Recall that the e¢ cient level of care for activity f1 is a function of  and the sumbp3 + bp4 + bp8 (the updated probability that f1 yields z2), and the e¢ cient level of care for
activity f2 is a function of  and the sum bp2 + bp4 + bp6 (the updated probability that f2 yields
z2). Without act independence, the sums bp3 + bp4 + bp8 and bp2 + bp4 + bp6 are only partially
identied (because bp6 and bp8 are not separately identied), creating ambiguity with respect
to the updated risks of both activities. As a result, the court cannot stipulate precise new
due care standards for activities f1 and f2. The best the court can do is specify lower and
upper bounds:
bx1 2 (1  )(p3 + p4)z2 + z3
2
;
((1  )(p3 + p4) + ) z2 + z3
2

and bx2 2 (1  )(p2 + p4)z2 + z3
2
;
((1  )(p2 + p4) + ) z2 + z3
2

:
Given these bounds, and given that the victims claims make the world aware of z3 (and
that it is linked to f1 and f2), the injurers and victims of the world can deduce , , and ;
however, the best they can do is infer bounds on bh1(x1) and bh2(x2).
As before, the ambiguity can be resolved if, by virtue of the suit, the parties learn more
about bp. For instance, if the parties learn not only  and  but also either bp3 + bp4 + bp8 orbp2 + bp4 + bp6, this is su¢ cient to separately identify bp5, bp6, bp7, and bp8. With this, the court
can stipulate precise new due care standards for f1 and f2, from which injurers and victims
of the world can learn bh1(x2) and bh2(x2).
In summary, without act independence, reverse Bayesianism only partially identies bp.
This does not create an issue in the case of a new act the courts information is su¢ ciently
precise to stipulate a due care standard with respect to each activity. In the case of a new
link or consequence, however, the partial identication of bp creates ambiguity with respect
to the updated risk of one or both activities, leading to imprecise due care standards. In
short, we might say that, without act independence, negligence achieves only boundedly
optimaldeterrence. That said, negligence still has a partial advantage over strict liability.
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Whats more, the ambiguity in any case can be resolved if the parties learn more about bp.
In other words, the more the parties learn about the updated probability of harm, the less
important is the act independence assumption for our results.28
5 General Results
In this section, we show that our results extend to a more general model with m acts and
n consequences. We also relax the shape restrictions on the care cost and expected harm
reduction functions and assume only that each is convex.
Let F = ff1; : : : ; fmg be the set of activities and Z = fz1; : : : ; zng be the set of harms,
where 0  z1 < z2 <    < zn. For each activity fi, the cost of taking care xi  0 is
c(xi), where c(0) = 0, c0(xi) > 0, and c00(xi) > 0 for all xi  0. Activity fis expected
harm is hi(xi) 
Pn
j=1 ijzj(xi), where (i) ij is the probability that fi causes zj and
(ii) (xi) 2 (0; 1], (0) = 1,  0(xi) < 0, and  00(xi)  0 for all xi  0.29
Given F and Z, the conceivable state space is ZF , where each state s 2 ZF is a vector
of length m, the ith element of which, si, is the harm zj 2 Z caused by activity fi 2 F in
that state. The feasible state space is S  ZFnN , where N  ZF is the set of null states.
Each state in N is induced by a nullied link between an activity fi and a harm zj.
Let p represent the partiescommon beliefs on ZF . The support set of p is S. That is,
p(s) > 0 for all s 2 S and p(s) = 0 for all s 2 N .
Given S and p, the e¢ cient levels of care are exi =  1 Pnj=1 ijzj, i = 1; : : : ;m, where
(i)  1 denotes the inverse of (xi)   c0(xi)= 0(xi) and (ii) ij =
P
s2S:si=zj
p(s). Under
negligence, the court stipulates xi = exi as the due care standard for each activity fi.
28Recall that the partiesare the injurer, the victim, and the court.
29For example, we could have (xi) = e xi .
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5.1 New Link
Assume N 6= ;, so S  ZF . Suppose the parties discover a new link from fl to zk for some
l 2 f1; : : : ;mg and k 2 f1; : : : ; ng. Let bS denote the expanded feasible state space and bp
denote the partiesupdated beliefs. In addition, let  = bSnS. We assume that, by virtue of
a tort litigation, the parties learn that fl yields zk with probability  > 0.
By reverse Bayesianism, p(s)=p(t) = bp(s)=bp(t) for all s; t 2 S. In addition,  = bp() by
denition and
P
s2bS bp(s) = 1. Moreover, by act independence, bp(s) = Qmi=1 bp (Ai(si)) for all
s = (s1; : : : ; sm) 2 , where Ai(zj)  ft 2 bS : ti = zjg is the event that activity fi yields
harm zj.
Given any s 2 , let L(s)  ft 2 S : ti = si; 8 i 6= lg denote the event in S that
corresponds to s 2 . It follows that:
Proposition 4. In the case of a new link involving fl:
(i) bp(s) = (1  )p(s) for all s 2 S; and
(ii) bp(s) = p (L(s)) for all s 2 .
Given bS and bp, the e¢ cient levels of care are bexi =  1 Pnj=1 bijzj, i = 1; : : : ;m, wherebij = P
s2bS:si=zj bp(s). Specically:
Proposition 5. In the case of a new link from fl to zk:
(i) bexl =  1 Pnj=1(1  )ljzj + zk; and
(ii) bexi = exi for all i 6= l.
Corollary 2. bexl = exl if and only if zk = Pnj=1 ljzj:
Thus, the discovery that fl can yield zk necessitates the stipulation of a new due care standard
for fl (unless zk =
Pn
j=1 ljzj) but not for the other activities.
Under negligence, the court stipulates bxl = bexl as the new due care standard for fl (or
restipulates bxl = exl if zk = Pnj=1 ljzj) and holds the injurer liable to pay damages of zk to
the victim if bxl > xl. This, along with the victims claim, makes the injurers and victims of
the world aware that fl can yield zk. Moreover, they can deduce  from bxl.
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Proposition 6. In the case of a new link from fl to zk,  =
c0(bxl)+Pnj=1 ljzj 0(bxl)Pn
j=1
ljzj 0(bxl) zk 0(bxl) :
As a result, they can learn bp and bhl(xl) = Pnj=1 [(1  )ijzj + zk] (xl), without expending
additional resources to learn about . Knowledge of bhl(xl) is necessary to induce the injurers
of the world to take e¢ cient care.
Under strict liability, the court simply holds the injurer liable to pay damages of zk to
the victim. This makes the injurers and victims of the world aware that fl can yield zk.
However, they cannot deduce  or learn bp or bhl(xl). Without knowledge of bhl(xl), strict
liability cannot induce injurers to take e¢ cient care.
5.2 New Act
Assume S  ZF . Suppose the parties discover a new act, fm+1. Let bS denote the expanded
feasible state space and bp denote the partiesupdated beliefs. We assume that, by virtue
of a tort litigation, the parties learn that fm+1 yields zj with probability j > 0 for all
j = 1; : : : ; n.30 Note that
Pn
j=1 j = 1.
By reverse Bayesianism, p(s)=p(t) = bp(E(s))=bp(E(t)) for all s; t 2 S, where E(s)  ft 2bS : ti = si; 8 i 6= m + 1g denotes the event in bS that corresponds to s 2 S. Note that
fE(s) : s 2 Sg forms a partition of bS and that jE(s)j = n for all s 2 S. With a slight abuse
of notation, index the states in each E(s) by j = 1; : : : ; n.
By denition, j = bp(Am+1(zj)), where Ai(zj)  ft 2 bS : ti = zjg is the event that
activity fi yields harm zj. In addition,
P
s2bS bp(s) = 1. Moreover, by act independence,bp(s) = Qm+1i=1 bp (Ai(si)) for all s = (s1; : : : ; sm+1) 2 bS.
It follows that:
Proposition 7. In the case of a new act fm+1, for all s 2 S and corresponding E(s)  bS,bp(sj) = jp(s) for all sj 2 E(s), j = 1; : : : ; n.
30Assuming j > 0 for all j = 1; : : : ; n is without loss of generality. We can deal with the case where j = 0
for some j by assuming j > 0 for the rst k < n and changing n to k as necessary in the statements below.
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Given bS and bp, the e¢ cient levels of care are bexi =  1 Pnj=1 bijzj, i = 1; : : : ;m + 1,
where bij = P
s2bS:si=zj bp(s). Specically:
Proposition 8. In the case of a new act fm+1:
(i) bexi = exi for all i 6= m+ 1; and
(ii) bexm+1 =  1 Pnj=1 jzj.
Thus, the discovery of fm+1 necessitates the stipulation of a new due care standard, bxm+1,
but it does not necessitate the stipulation of new due care standards for f1; : : : ; fm.
Under negligence, the court stipulates bxm+1 = bexm+1 as the due care standard for the
new activity fm+1 and holds the injurer liable to pay damages to the victim. This makes
the injurers and victims of the world aware of fm+1 (and that it is risky). Although they
cannot separately deduce each j from bxm+1, they nevertheless can infer bhm+1(xm+1) frombxm+1, without expending additional resources to learn all j.31
Proposition 9. In the case of a new act fm+1, bhm+1(xm+1) =   c0(bxm+1) 0(bxm+1)(xm+1):
Knowledge of bhm+1(xm+1) is necessary to induce the worlds injurers to take e¢ cient care.
Under strict liability, the court simply holds the injurer liable to pay damages to the
victim. This makes the injurers and victims of the world aware of fm+1 (and that it is risky).
However, they do not learn bhm+1(xm+1). Without knowledge of bhm+1(xm+1), strict liability
cannot induce injurers to take e¢ cient care.
5.3 New Consequence
Assume S  ZF . Suppose the parties discover a new consequence, zn+1. Let bS denote
the expanded feasible state space and bp denote the partiesupdated beliefs. In addition, let
31Note, however, that if each zj is a di¤erent type of harm that requires a di¤erent type of care, then the
court would stipulate a di¤erent due care standard bxm+1;j with respect to each zj , in which case the injurers
and victims of the world could separately deduce each j .
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 = bSnS and  = bp(). We assume that, by virtue of a tort litigation, the parties learn that
fi yields zn+1 with probability i > 0 for all i = 1; : : : ;m.32 Note that 1   =
Qm
i=1(1 i).
By reverse Bayesianism, p(s)=p(t) = bp(s)=bp(t) for all s; t 2 S. In addition, i =bp(Ai(zn+1)) by denition and Ps2bS bp(s) = 1. Moreover, by act independence, bp(s) =Qm
i=1 bp (Ai(si)) for all s = (s1; : : : ; sm) 2 .
Given any s 2 , let I(s)  fi 2 f1; : : : ;mg : si = zn+1g denote the indices of the
acts that yield zn+1 in that state of the world, let I(s)  fi 2 f1; : : : ;mg : si 6= zn+1g
denote the indices of the acts that do not yield zn+1 in that state of the world, and let
C(s)  ft 2 S : ti = si; 8 i 2 I(s)g denote the event in S that corresponds to s 2  on I(s).
It follows that:
Proposition 10. In the case of a new consequence zn+1:
(i) bp(s) = (Qmi=1(1  i)) p(s) for all s 2 S;
(ii) bp(s) = Qi2I(s) iQi2I(s)(1  i) p (C(s)) for all s 2  such that I(s) $ f1; : : : ;mg;
(iii) bp(s) = Qmi=1 i for the s 2  such that I(s) = f1; : : : ;mg.
Given bS and bp, the e¢ cient levels of care are bexi =  1 Pn+1j=1 bijzj, i = 1; : : : ;m, wherebij = P
s2bS:si=zj bp(s). Specically:
Proposition 11. In the case of a new consequence zn+1, bexi =  1 Pnj=1(1  i)ijzj + izn+1
for all i = 1; : : : ;m.
Corollary 3. bexi = exi if and only if zn+1 = Pnj=1 ijzj.
Thus, the discovery of zn+1 necessitates the stipulation of new due care standards for each
activity fi such that zn+1 6=
Pn
j=1 ijzj.
Under negligence, the court stipulates bxi = bexi, i = 1; : : : ;m, as the new due care standards
for f1; : : : ; fm (or restipulates bxi = exi if zn+1 = Pnj=1 ijzj) and holds the injurer liable to
pay damages of zn+1 to the victim with respect to each activity fi such that bxi > xi. This,
32Assuming i > 0 for all i is without loss of generality. We can deal with the case where i > 0 for some
i by assuming i > 0 for the rst l < m and changing m to l as necessary in the statements below.
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along with the victims claims, makes the injurers and victims of the world aware of zn+1
(and that it is linked to f1; : : : ; fm). Moreover, they can deduce 1; : : : ; m from bx1; : : : ; bxm.
Proposition 12. In the case of a new consequence zn+1, i =
c0(bxi)+Pnj=1 ijzj 0(bxi)Pn
j=1
ijzj 0(bxi) zn+1 0(bxi) ; for
all i = 1; : : : ;m.
As a result, they can learn bp and bh1(x1); : : : ;bhm(xm), without expending additional resources
to learn about 1; : : : ; m. Knowledge of bh1(x1); : : : ;bhm(xm) is necessary to induce injurers
to take e¢ cient care.
Under strict liability, the court simply holds the injurer liable to pay damages of zn+1 to
the victim with respect to each activity fi. This makes the injurers and victims of the world
aware of zn+1 (and that it is linked to f1; : : : ; fm). However, they cannot deduce 1; : : : ; m;
and hence learn bp and bh1(x1); : : : ;bhm(xm). Again, without knowledge of bh1(x1); : : : ;bhm(xm),
strict liability cannot induce e¢ cient care.
6 Discussion
This paper extends the economic analysis of tort law to incorporate unawareness. We com-
pare and contrast negligence and strict liability in a unilateral accident model with unaware-
ness and growing awareness, and nd that negligence has a key advantage the due care
standard serves as a knowledge transmission mechanism. Under either tort liability rule, a
suit involving a newly discovered act, consequence, or act-consequence link makes the world
aware of a new possibility of harm. But only negligence, through the stipulation of new
due care standards, spreads awareness about the updated probability of harm. As such, the
negligence due care standard is like a public good. The social benet of spreading awareness
about the updated probability of harm is that potential injurers and victims need not expend
additional resources to develop this knowledge wastefully duplicative activity that would
be necessary to achieve optimal deterrence under strict liability. In a sense, negligence is
akin to patents; both carry social costs (negligence is more costly to administer; patents
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create monopolies and deadweight loss), yet both provide social benets in terms of knowl-
edge transmission. One should bear in mind, however, that we do not purport to undertake
a full welfare analysis. We do not claim that negligence is superior to strict liability in all
circumstances. Rather, we claim that negligence is more robust to unawareness.
To model unawareness and growing awareness, we adopt the reverse Bayesian approach
of Karni and Vierø (2013). The reverse Bayesian model has (at least) two attractive features.
The rst is transparency. Karni and Vierø (2013) provide an axiomatic foundation for the
model, and so one can judge the theory by the axioms.33 The second attractive feature of
the model is its accessibility. The model is built upon a familiar choice-theoretic framework
(subjective expected utility theory), and the upshot is a belief revision theory that mirrors
the process of Bayesian updating.34 At the same time, the model has its shortcomings.
For instance, Chambers and Hayashi (2018) criticize its empirical content from a revealed
preference perspective. They show that, in the case of a new consequence, the model does not
make singular predictions about observable choices over feasible acts. A second shortcoming
of the model is that it assumes a naive or myopic unawareness people are unaware that they
are unaware. A sophisticated unawareness, where people are aware that they are unaware,
may be more realistic. Aware of this shortcoming, Karni and Vierø (2017) extend their model
to the case of sophisticated unawareness. The end result is a generalization that maintains
the avor of reverse Bayesianism and nests the naive model as a special case.
The pros and cons of the model aside, one might question the importance of our results
in a world with safety regulation in addition to tort liability. In such a world, one could
argue, there are regulators and other non-court actors who can spread awareness about
newly discovered risks. While this may be correct, it is orthogonal to our inquiry. We are
contributing to the negligence versus strict liability debate. We therefore consider a world
where the tort system is the only mechanism for regulating risky activities, and we compare
33The key axioms of the model are the consistency axioms, which essentially require that preferences
conditional on the original state of awareness are not altered by growing awareness.
34This feature prompts Dominiak and Tserenjigmid (2018, p. 3) to describe Karni and Vierøs (2013)
model as elegant.
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and contrast the two primary tort liability rules. If one were to consider a world with
safety regulation in addition to tort law, one would have to wade into the liability versus
regulation debate (e.g., Shavell, 1984a,b; Posner, 2010), and conclude that regulation is the
more e¢ cient method of social control, before one could assert that the possibility of safety
regulation renders moot the debate over tort liability rules.
The importance of unawareness and growing awareness via technological progress, sci-
entic discovery, or otherwise plainly extends beyond the case of unilateral accidents with
xed activity levels. Natural extensions of this paper, therefore, would entail introducing
unawareness into other accident settings. In addition, future research could examine the
implications of unawareness for the economic analysis of other areas of law such as contract
remedies and criminal law or of other legal topics such as litigation and settlement.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
By reverse Bayesianism, the denition of , and bp1 + bp2 + bp3 + bp4 = 1, we have two linearly
independent equations, bp2 = p2
p1
bp1 and bp1 + bp2 = 1  ;
and two unknowns, bp1 and bp2. Substituting the rst equation into the second, we have
bp1 + p2
p1
bp1 = 1  ;
which implies bp1 = (1  )p1
p1 + p2
= (1  )p1;
where the last equality follows from p1 + p2 = 1. It follows that
bp2 = p2
p1
(1  )p1 = (1  )p2:
By act independence and the denition of , we have
bp3 = (bp1 + bp3) and bp4 = (bp2 + bp4);
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which imply bp3 = 
1   bp1 and bp4 = 1   bp2:
It follows that
bp3 = 
1   (1  )p1 = p1 and bp4 = 1   (1  )p2 = p2:
Proof of Proposition 2
Reverse Bayesianism implies three linearly independent conditions:35
p2(bp1 + bp5) = p1(bp2 + bp6);
p3(bp1 + bp5) = p1(bp3 + bp7);
and p4(bp1 + bp5) = p1(bp4 + bp8):
Summing the left- and right-hand sides, and adding p1(bp1 + bp5) to each side, yields
(p1 + p2 + p3 + p4)(bp1 + bp5) = (bp1 +   + bp8)p1:
Because p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 1 and bp1 +   + bp8 = 1, we have bp1 + bp5 = p1. Substituting this
back into the reverse Bayesian conditions yields
bp1 + bp5 = p1; bp2 + bp6 = p2; bp3 + bp7 = p3; and bp4 + bp8 = p4:
By act independence and the denition of , we have
bp5 = (bp1 + bp2 + bp5 + bp6)(bp1 + bp3 + bp5 + bp7)(bp5 + bp6 + bp7 + bp8) = (bp1 + bp5);bp6 = (bp1 + bp2 + bp5 + bp6)(bp2 + bp4 + bp6 + bp8)(bp5 + bp6 + bp7 + bp8) = (bp2 + bp6);bp7 = (bp3 + bp4 + bp7 + bp8)(bp1 + bp3 + bp5 + bp7)(bp5 + bp6 + bp7 + bp8) = (bp3 + bp7);
and bp8 = (bp3 + bp4 + bp7 + bp8)(bp2 + bp4 + bp6 + bp8)(bp5 + bp6 + bp7 + bp8) = (bp4 + bp8);
where the second equality follows from iterative application of act independence.36 These
imply bp5 = 
1   bp1; bp6 = 1   bp2; bp7 = 1   bp3; and bp8 = 1   bp4:
35Note that the six reverse Bayesianism conditions are not linearly independent. In particular, we can
derive the last three conditions from the rst three.
36For example, (bp1+bp2+bp5+bp6)(bp1+bp3+bp5+bp7) = bp(fs1; s2; s5; s6g)bp(fs1; s3; s5; s7g) = bp(fs1; s2; s5; s6g\
fs1; s3; s5; s7g) = bp(fs1; s5g) = bp1 + bp5.
36
It follows that
bp1 + 
1   bp1 = p1; bp2 + 1   bp2 = p2; bp3 + 1   bp3 = p3; and bp4 + 1   bp4 = p4:
These imply
bp1 = (1  )p1; bp2 = (1  )p2; bp3 = (1  )p3; and bp4 = (1  )p4;
which in turn imply
bp5 = p1; bp6 = p2; bp7 = p3; and bp8 = p4:
Proof of Proposition 3
Reverse Bayesianism implies three linearly independent conditions:37
p2bp1 = p1bp2;
p3bp1 = p1bp3;
and p4bp1 = p1bp4:
Summing the left- and right-hand sides, and adding p1bp1 to each side, yields
(p1 + p2 + p3 + p4)bp1 = (bp1 +   + bp4)p1:
By p1 +p2 +p3 +p4 = 1, bp1 +  +bp9 = 1, and   bp5 +bp6 +bp7 +bp8 +bp9, we have bp1 = (1 )p1.
Substituting this back into the reverse Bayesian conditions yields
bp1 = (1  )p1; bp2 = (1  )p2; bp3 = (1  )p3; and bp4 = (1  )p4:
By act independence and the denitions of  and , we have
bp5 = (bp5 + bp6 + bp9)(bp1 + bp3 + bp5) = (bp1 + bp3 + bp5);bp6 = (bp5 + bp6 + bp9)(bp2 + bp4 + bp6) = (bp2 + bp4 + bp6);bp7 = (bp1 + bp2 + bp7)(bp7 + bp8 + bp9) = (bp1 + bp2 + bp7);bp8 = (bp3 + bp4 + bp8)(bp7 + bp8 + bp9) = (bp3 + bp4 + bp8);
and bp9 = (bp5 + bp6 + bp9)(bp7 + bp8 + bp9) = :
37Note again that the six reverse Bayesianism conditions are not linearly independent. In particular, we
can derive the last three conditions from the rst three.
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These imply
bp5 = 
1  (bp1 + bp3); bp6 = 1  (bp2 + bp4);bp7 = 
1   (bp1 + bp2); bp8 = 1   (bp3 + bp4);
and bp9 = :
From bp9 = , it follows that   bp5 + bp6 + bp7 + bp8 + bp9 =  +    , which implies
1   = (1  )(1  ). (Observe that 1   = (1  )(1  ) also follows directly from act
independence.) It follows that
bp1 = (1  )(1  )p1; bp2 = (1  )(1  )p2;bp3 = (1  )(1  )p3; and bp4 = (1  )(1  )p4;
and in turn that
bp5 = (1  )(p1 + p3); bp6 = (1  )(bp2 + bp4);bp7 = (1  )(bp1 + bp2); bp8 = (1  )(bp3 + bp4);
and bp9 = :
Proof of Corollary 1
We establish in the proof of Proposition 3 that
bp1 = (1  )p1; bp2 = (1  )p2;bp3 = (1  )p3; and bp4 = (1  )p4:
We also observe that 1   = (1  )(1  ) and  =  +    . It follows that
bp5 = (1  )(p1 + p3) = 
1  (1  )(p1 + p3) = (   )(p1 + p3);bp6 = (1  )(bp2 + bp4) = 
1  (1  )(bp2 + bp4) = (   )(bp2 + bp4);bp7 = (1  )(bp1 + bp2) = 
1   (1  )(bp1 + bp2) = (   )(bp1 + bp2);
bp8 = (1  )(bp3 + bp4) = 
1   (1  )(bp3 + bp4) = (   )(bp3 + bp4);
and bp9 =  +    :
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Proof of Proposition 4
(i) Take any s 2 S. By reverse Bayesianism, we have jSj   1 linearly independent equations:
bp(t) = p(t)
p(s)
bp(s); 8 t 2 S, t 6= s. (4.1)
By the denition of  and
P
t2bS bp(t) = 1, we haveP
t2S bp(t) = 1  : (4.2)
Substituting (4.1) into (4.2), we have
bp(s) + X
t2S:t6=s
p(t)
p(s)
bp(s) = 1  ;
which implies bp(s) = (1  )p(s)P
t2S p(t)
= (1  )p(s); (4.3)
where the last equality follows from
P
t2S p(t) = 1.
(ii) Take any s 2 . By act independence,
bp(s) = Qmi=1 bp  Ai(si) :
Observe that bp  Al(sl) = bp (Al(zk)) =  and Ti 6=lAi(si) = L(s) [ fsg. It follows that
bp(s) = Qi 6=l bp  Ai(si) = bpTi 6=lAi(si)
= bp (L(s) [ fsg) =  [bp (L(s)) + bp(s)] ;
which implies bp(s) = 
1   bp(L(s)): (4.4)
Observe that L(s) is the union of all t 2 S such that ti = si for all i 6= l. It follows that
bp(L(s)) = Pt2L(s) bp(t) = Pt2L(s)(1  )p(t) = (1  )p(L(s)); (4.5)
where the second equality follows from (4.3). Substituting (4.5) back into (4.4), we havebp(s) = p(L(s)).
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Proof of Proposition 5
(i) Observe that
Pn
j=1 bljzj = Pj 6=k bljzj + zk: By Proposition 4,
P
j 6=k
bljzj = P
j 6=k
" P
s2bS:sl=zj bp(s)
#
zj =
P
j 6=k
" P
s2S:sl=zj
(1  )p(s) + P
s2:sl=zj
p (L(s))
#
zj:
Observe that sl = zk for all s 2 . It follows that, for all j 6= k,P
s2:sl=zj
p (L(s)) = 0:
Thus, we have
P
j 6=k
bljzj = P
j 6=k
" P
s2S:sl=zj
(1  )p(s)
#
zj =
P
j 6=k
(1  )ljzj =
Pn
j=1(1  )ljzj;
where the last equality follows from lk = 0. Hence,
Pn
j=1 bljzj = Pnj=1(1  )ljzj + zk.
(ii) Take any i 6= l and any j. By Proposition 4,
bij = P
s2bS:si=zj bp(s) =
P
s2S:si=zj
(1  )p(s) + P
s2:si=zj
p (L(s)) :
Observe that L(s) is the union of all t 2 S such that ti = si for all i 6= l. Thus,
P
s2:si=zj
p (L(s)) =
P
t2S:ti=zj
p (t) :
Hence, bij = P
s2S:si=zj
(1  )p(s) + P
s2S:si=zj
p (s) =
P
s2S:si=zj
p(s) = ij:
It follows that bexi = exi for all i 6= l.
Proof of Corollary 2
By Proposition 5, (bexl) = Pnj=1(1   )ljzj + zk. Observe that (exl) = Pnj=1 ljzj. It
follows that (bexl) = (exl) if and only if zk = Pnj=1 ljzj. Because 0(xi) > 0 for all xi, we
have bexl = exl if and only if zk = Pnj=1 ljzj.
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Proof of Proposition 6
By Proposition 5 and bxl = bexl, we have (bxl) = Pnj=1(1  )ljzj + zk. It follows that
 =
(bxl) Pnj=1 ljzj
zk  
Pn
j=1 ljzj
:
Observe that (bxl) =  c0(bxl)= 0(bxl). Thus,
 =
c0(bxl) +Pnj=1 ljzj 0(bxl)Pn
j=1 ljzj
0(bxl)  zk 0(bxl) :
Proof of Proposition 7
Take any s 2 S. By reverse Bayesianism, we have jSj   1 linearly independent equations:
p(t)bp(E(s)) = p(s)bp(E(t)); 8 t 2 S, t 6= s.
Summing the left- and right-hand sides, and adding p(s)bp(E(s)) to each side, yields
bp(E(s))Pt2S p(t) = p(s)Pt2S bp(E(t)):
Because
P
t2S p(t) = 1 and
P
t2S bp(E(t)) = 1, we have
bp(E(s)) = p(s): (7.1)
Take any sj 2 E(s), j 2 f1; : : : ; ng. By act independence,
bp(sj) = Qm+1i=1 bp  Ai(sij) :
Observe that bp  Am+1(sm+1j ) = bp (Am+1(zj)) = j and Tmi=1 Ai(sij) = E(s). It follows that
bp(sj) = jQmi=1 bp  Ai(sij) = jbp  Tmi=1Ai(sij) = jbp (E(s)) : (7.2)
Substituting (7.1) into (7.2), we have bp(sj) = jp(s).
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Proof of Proposition 8
(i) Recall that fE(s) : s 2 Sg forms a partition of bS. Take any i 6= m + 1 and any j. By
Proposition 7,
bij = P
s2bS:si=zj bp(s) =
P
s2S:si=zj
" P
sl2E(s)
bp(sl)# :
=
P
s2S:si=zj

nP
l=1
lp(s)

=
P
s2S:si=zj
p(s)

nP
l=1
l

:
Note that
Pn
l=1 l = 1. Thus, bij = P
s2S:si=zj
p(s) = ij. It follows that bexi = exi for all
i 6= m+ 1.
(ii) By denition, bm+1;j = j for all j = 1; : : : ; n. Hence, bexm+1 =  1 Pnj=1 jzj.
Proof of Proposition 9
Observe that bhm+1(xm+1) = Pnj=1 bm+1;jzj(xm+1) and bxm+1 = bexm+1 =  1 Pnj=1 bm+1;jzj.
The latter implies (bxm+1) = Pnj=1 bm+1;jzj. Thus, bhm+1(xm+1) = (bxm+1)(xm+1). Recall
that (xi)   c0(xi)= 0(xi). Hence, bhm+1(xm+1) =   c0(bxm+1) 0(bxm+1)(xm+1):
Proof of Proposition 10
(i) Take any s 2 S. By reverse Bayesianism, we have jSj   1 linearly independent equations:
p(t)bp(s) = p(s)bp(t); 8 t 2 S, t 6= s.
Summing the left- and right-hand sides, and adding p(s)bp(s) to each side, yields
bp(s)Pt2S p(t) = p(s)Pt2S bp(t):
Observe that
P
t2S p(t) = 1 and
P
t2S bp(t) = 1   = Qmi=1(1  i). Thus,
bp(s) = (1  )p(s) = (Qmi=1(1  i)) p(s): (10.1)
(ii) Take any s 2  such that I(s) = fkg for any k 2 f1; : : : ;mg. By act independence,
bp(s) = Qmi=1 bp  Ai(si) :
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Observe that bp  Ak(sk) = bp (Ak(zn+1)) = k. Thus,
bp(s) = kQi2I(s) bp  Ai(si) :
Observe that I(s) = fkg implies Ti2I(s) Ai(si) = C(s) [ fsg. Hence,
bp(s) = kQi2I(s) bp  Ai(si) = kbpTi2I(s) Ai(si)
= kbp (C(s) [ fsg) = k (bp (C(s)) + bp (s)) ;
which implies bp(s) = k
1  k bp (C(s)) : (10.2)
Observe that C(s) is the union of all t 2 S such that ti = si for all i 2 I(s). It follows that
bp(C(s)) = Pt2C(s) bp(t) = Pt2C(s)(1  )p(t) = (1  )p(C(s)); (10.3)
where the second equality follows from (10.1). Substituting (10.3) back into (10.2), we have
bp(s) = k
1  k (1  )p(C(s)) = k
Q
i2I(s)(1  i)p(C(s));
where the last equality follows from 1   = Qmi=1(1  i).
Next take any s 2  such that I(s) = fk; lg for any fk; lg  f1; : : : ;mg. By act
independence, bp(s) = Qmi=1 bp  Ai(si) :
Observe that bp  Ak(sk) = bp (Ak(zn+1)) = k. Thus,
bp(s) = kQi2fI(s)[flgg bp  Ai(si) :
Observe that I(s) = fk; lg implies Ti2fI(s)[flggAi(si) = D(s) [ fsg, where D(s)  fr 2  :
ri = si; 8 i 2 fI(s) [ flgg. Hence,
bp(s) = kQi2fI(s)[flgg bp  Ai(si) = kbpTi2fI(s)[flgAi(si)
= kbp (D(s) [ fsg) = k (bp (D(s)) + bp (s)) ;
which implies bp(s) = k
1  k bp (D(s)) : (10.4)
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Observe further that I(r) = flg for all r 2 D(s). It follows that
bp (D(s)) = Pt2D(s) bp(t)
=
P
t2D(s)
l
1  l (1  )p(C(t))
=
l
1  l (1  )p(C(s)): (10.5)
Substituting (10.5) back into (10.4), we have
bp(s) = k
1  k
l
1  l (1  )p(C(s)):
= kl
Q
i2I(s)(1  i)p(C(s)):
Proceeding in this fashion to consider s 2  such that I(s) is an -element subset of
f1; : : : ;mg for all  = 3; : : : ;m  1, we establish that
bp(s) = Qi2I(s) iQi2I(s)(1  i) p (C(s))
for all s 2  such that I(s)  f1; : : : ;mg.
(iii) Take the s 2  such that I(s) = f1; : : : ;mg. By act independence, bp(s) =Qm
i=1 bp (Ai(si)). Observe that bp (Ai(si)) = bp (Ai(zn+1)) = i for all i 2 I(s). Because
I(s) = f1; : : : ;mg, we have bp(s) = Qmi=1 i.
Proof of Proposition 11
Take any i 2 f1; : : : ;mg. Observe that
bexi =  1 Pn+1j=1 bijzj =  1 Pnj=1 bijzj + izn+1 : (11.1)
Let  (l; s) 
Q
l2I(s) l
Q
l2I(s)(1  l)

for all s 2 . By Proposition 10,
bij = P
s2bS:si=zj bp(s) =
P
s2S:si=zj
Qm
l=1(1  l)p(s) +
P
s2:si=zj
 (l; s)p(C(s));
for all j 6= n+ 1. Observe that
P
s2S:si=zj
Qm
l=1(1  l)p(s) =
Qm
l=1(1  l)
P
s2S:si=zj
p(s) = (1  )ij
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and that
P
s2:si=zj
 (l; s)p(C(s)) =
P
s2:si=zj
Q
l2I(s) l
Q
l2I(s)(1  l)

p(C(s))
=
P
s2:si=zj
Q
l2I(s) lQ
l2I(s)(1  l)
(1  )p(C(s))
=
P
Iff1;:::;mgnfigg
Q
l2I lQ
l2I(1  l)
(1  )ij
=
1 Ql 6=i(1  l)Q
l 6=i(1  l)
(1  )ij:
Thus,
bij = (1  )ij + 1 Ql 6=i(1  l)Q
l 6=i(1  l)
(1  )ij
= (1  )ij
 
1Q
l 6=i(1  l)
!
= (1  )ij

1  i
1  

= (1  i)ij: (11.2)
Substituting (11.2) back into (11.1), we have bexi =  1 Pnj=1(1  i)ijzj + izn+1.
Proof of Corollary 3
By Proposition 11, (bexi) = Pnj=1(1 i)ijzj+(1 i)zn+1. Observe that (exi) = Pnj=1 ijzj.
It follows that (bexi) = (exi) if and only if zn+1 = Pnj=1 ijzj. Because 0(xi) > 0 for all xi,
we have bexi = exi if and only if zn+1 = Pnj=1 ijzj.
Proof of Proposition 12
Take any i 2 f1; : : : ;mg. By Proposition 11, bxi = bexi =  1 Pnj=1(1  i)ijzj + izn+1,
which implies (bxi) = Pnj=1(1  i)ijzj + izn+1. It follows that
i =
(bxi) Pnj=1 ijzj
zn+1  
Pn
j=1 ijzj
:
Observe that (bxi) =  c0(bxi)= 0(bxi). Thus,
i =
c0(bxi) +Pnj=1 ijzj 0(bxi)Pn
j=1 ijzj
0(bxi)  zn+1 0(bxi) :
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